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In the early 1980’s a juicy scandal erupted in connection with 
a controversial liaison between critical practice and literary 
theory. Their tempestuous relationship became an object of 
critical scrutiny on the part of Walter Benn Michaels and Steven 
Knapp, whose essay “Against Theory” is a testimony to their 
unprecedented mistrust of any kind of meta-practice. In what 
follows I propose to interrogate both parties, i.e. those who 
defend the claims of theory and those who want to do away with 
it altogether. The latter group is often associated with the New 
Pragmatism whose origins and precepts I will discuss further on 
in this essay. Eventually, a pragmatist critical perspective will be 
brought to bear on both positions to demonstrate their respective 
advantages and disadvantages.
If theory may be charged with metapractical pretensions, a 
position which lays claim to a critical distance on theory itself may be 
suspected of metatheoretical ones. Therefore it must be stressed that 
my remarks on theory and its discontents will be made from within 
the enterprise and will never aspire to a metatheoretical status. One of 
the basic themes of any version of pragmatism is its insistence on the 
inescapable situatedness of our opinions. Mine will also come from a 
particular position, circumscribed by a set of beliefs and preconceptions 
that none of us can possibly transcend altogether. Rather than erect 
binary oppositions between theory and its New Pragmatist critique, I 
will seek to reintegrate the latter into the former and redescribe the 
New Pragmatism as theory’s interiorised other.
The tendency to reconcile apparent antagonisms is what seems 
to have inspired Knapp and Michaels in the first place. Their 
vociferous pronouncements against theory rest on the contention 
that theory flourishes by positing divisions and separations 
where there are none. Their essay is a tour de force not because it 
provides a key to all the hitherto unsolved theoretical problems but 
because it reduces them all to a couple of rudimentary propositions 
concerning the issues of belief and intention. More than that, 
“Against Theory” ensures its own effectiveness as a critique 
of theory by assigning an unequivocal definition to this highly 
ambivalent concept, whose identification is Knapp and Michaels’s 
preliminary, and strategically inestimable, step to its subsequent 
demolition. That in the long run their blows strike empty air is 
another corollary of their own argument: Knapp and Michaels first 
declare war against theory only to acknowledge that theory as they 
define it (for the purpose of their own critique) does not and cannot 
exist. If indeed, as they insist, “no one can reach a position outside 
practice,”1 why go to such lengths to nip in the bud the aspirations 
of theorists who want to institute a metapractical agenda?
1 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Against Theory,” in Against 
Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 30.
2 Ibidem, p. 11.
Let us retrace their argument step by step. What Knapp and 
Michaels are up to is aptly conveyed by the title of their essay. At 
its outset they qualify their attack by narrowing down the defini­
tion of theory to “a special project in literary criticism: the attempt 
to govern interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an ac­
count of interpretation in general.”1 2 Thus they leave aside vast ar-
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eas of literary studies such as narratology, stylistics, and prosody, 
which they deem “essentially empirical”3 rather than theoretical. 
Having staked out the territory that their opponent is authorised 
to occupy, they launch a full-scale offensive. Again, they claim the 
right to choose the weapon: they take up two exemplary concerns 
— intention and belief — to demonstrate their utterly unprob­
lematical status and accordingly pull the carpet from under the 
feet of those who might still be inclined to spin theoretical yarns 
about those two notions. In short, their examples “are meant to 
represent the central mechanism of all theoretical arguments, and 
[their] treatment of them is meant to indicate that all such argu­
ments will fail and fail in the same way.”4 Knapp and Michaels’s 
argument, in turn, will prevail solely by virtue of its unassailable 
reductionism and plain commonsensicality.5
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, p. 12.
0 For an inciting discussion of the traps and temptations that inhere in being 
common-sensical, see Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 74—75.
8 See S. Knapp and W.B. Michaels, “Against Theory...,” pp. 13—15.
7 Ibidem, p. 15.
8 See Jonathan Crewe, “Toward Uncritical Practice,” in Against Theory..., p. 62.
Of the two substantial arguments against theory that Knapp 
and Michaels put forward, the one which identifies text’s meaning 
with author’s intention deserves particular consideration. In 
the second section of their essay, Knapp and Michaels take E.D. 
Hirsch, Jr. — an exemplary intentionalist in their view — to task 
for implicitly positing a moment of interpretation before intention 
is present.6 But in fact their own conclusions beg their question, 
inasmuch as what they assume to be evidence of the impossibility 
of meaning without intention boils down to an illustration of “how 
difficult it is to imagine a case of intentionless meaning.”7 They use 
their demonstration very much like a weapon which has already 
been tested in battle and proved efficacious in slaying the dragon 
of theory whereas the point is still a contestable one, as Jonathan 
Crewe points out in his response to Knapp and Michaels’s essay.8
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This is particularly conspicuous in their assault on 
Hirsch’s distinction between “the author’s meaning” and 
“the reader’s meaning.” Whilst many literary critics would 
certainly subscribe to the claim about meaning and inten­
tion being inseparable, few will be naive enough to attach 
any practical significance to the intended meaning that the 
empirical author infused into her/his text. Hirsch stresses that 
we must carefully distinguish between “what the author intend­
ed” and “what the author intends,”9 a distinction which involves 
two different intentional agents. And though I believe that Knapp 
and Michaels are right to argue that we cannot construe meaning 
without assigning intention, I cannot understand why they turn a 
blind eye to the uselessness of identifying meaning with what the 
actual composer of the text might have intended. In their attempt 
to outrun theory they reach a dead end rather than a practical 
resolution of the problem: their insistence that “the object of all 
reading is always the historical author’s intention”10 11is not only 
indicative of their utopian nostalgy for the good old days before 
theory but it fails to provide a workable strategy for the critic 
as well. Are we to divine the meaning of a text inspired by some 
higher spiritual afflatus, in an act of mental communion with 
the long departed author? Or shall we fall back on guesswork and 
bare speculation? Surely, sober pragmatists that they aspire to 
be would not recommend that we distill the composer’s intention 
from the intrinsic qualities of the text?11
9 See E.D. Hirsch, Jr., “Against Theory?,” in Against Theory..., p. 50.
10 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics,” in Against 
Theory..., p. 103.
11 Curiously, Knapp and Michaels recognise “the empirical difficulty of deciding 
what [a text’s] author intended” but they fail to draw practical conclusions from 
that difficulty. See Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Reply to Rorty,” in 
Against Theory..., p. 142.
Clearly, given their position on authorial intention, Knapp and 
Michaels are left with two options. Either, in the absence of any 
verifiable information about the empirical author’s intention, they 
must postulate meaningless texts and thus at one fell swoop ren-
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der pointless not only theory but interpretive practice as well, or 
they must subscribe to a version of “strong” intentionalism which 
is essentialist at bottom and cannot possibly be squared with 
their avowedly pragmatist convictions. “Strong” intentionalism 
assumes that the author impregnates her/his work with her/his 
intention which is preserved in the form a signus Dei in the text 
itself. Accordingly, the reader must be able to decode a secret mes­
sage which lies hidden at the heart of each work and constitutes 
its unique essence. Needless to say, this conception is anathema to 
every orthodox pragmatist because “[pjragmatists are supposed to 
treat everything as a matter of a choice of context and nothing as a 
matter of intrinsic properties. They dissolve objects into functions, 
essences into momentary foci of attention, and knowing into suc­
cess at reweaving a web of beliefs and desires into more supple and 
elegant folds.”12 All things considered, the essentialist implications 
of Knapp and Michaels’s argument about intention — undesirable 
as they must be for their authors — testify to their confusion about 
the vantage point from which to attack theory. Those implications 
might also give evidence of the inevitable entrappment of each an- 
titheoretical stance within the confines of the discourse of theory.
12 Richard Rorty, “Philosophy without Principles,” in Against Theory..., p. 135.
13 S. Knapp and W.B. Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics...,” p. 104.
14 Ibidem, p. 105.
15 Ibidem.
17 The Same ...
Moreover, Knapp and Michaels’s intentional reductionism leads 
to confusion for purely logical reasons. The confusion results from 
an all-too-smooth transition from epistemology to ontology. When 
they argue that meaning and the historical author’s intention are 
inseparable, they act upon their own contention that “the object 
of interpretation is always a historical intention.”13 And though 
it may be true that “[a]ny interpreter of any utterance or text, 
within the institution of professional literary criticism or not, 
is [...] attempting to understand the author’s intention,”14 their 
conclusion that “texts mean what their authors intend”15 is not 
a conclusion at all. First of all, from the fact that we attempt to
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understand a text’s meaning, it does not follow that we can do so, 
at least not in the sense that the text is possessed of the meaning. 
Secondly, when we try to understand a text’s meaning, we indeed 
do so firmly convinced that we are divining the empirical author’s 
intention but in practice our divining comes down to imagining 
into being an intentional agent, what Michel Foucault calls the 
author-function16, who/which is our interpretive construct rather 
than a historical individual. To grasp that, one does not even need 
a theoretical argument: what we do as readers is an emipirical fact 
which is borne out by our interpretive practice.
16 See Michel Foucalt, “What Is an Author?,” in Authorship: From Plato 
to the Post-modern, ed. Sean Burke (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1995), pp. 233—246.
17 A similar point is made by Adena Rosmarin in her essay “Theory of 
‘Against Theory.’” See A. Rosmarin, “Theory of ‘Against Theory,’” in Against 
Theory..., pp. 80—88.
18 S. Knapp and W.B. Michaels, “Against Theory...,” p. 30.
What is particularly striking about Knapp and Michaels’s essay 
is not their dogged persistence in defying theory but the procedure 
they use to drive their message home. Their assault on theory con­
stitutes a theoretical moment per se.17 For one, they cannot help rely­
ing on the discourse they want to transcend: the framework of their 
essay and its rhetoric are borrowed from what they seek to discredit. 
Of theoretical significance are also the conclusions that Knapp and 
Michaels urge their readers to draw. If there are any practical con­
sequences that might follow from their propositions, they will be 
largely relevant to theory itself and to all those working within the 
enterprise. It goes without saying that they will not be sympathetic 
to the New Pragmatists’ appeal for ceasing all theoretical activity. 
Thus it is likely that Knapp and Michaels’s will prove to be a vacu­
ous gesture, with no practical effect on what they are out to anni­
hilate. They seem to anticipate as much when they conclude their 
essay by diminishing their opponent in the following words: “theory 
is nothing else but the attempt to escape practice.”18 Wouldn’t it be 
easier (and more consistent) then to demonstrate that by busying 
oneself with critical practice rather than theory?
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Although it might appear otherwise, what I have discussed up 
to this point is not meant to undermine the critical standpoint that 
Knapp and Michaels choose for their antitheoretical manifesto. 
On the contrary, I believe that their pragmatist approach is one 
of the most invigorating elements in current theoretical debates. 
It is just that I find the arrows of their arguments pointed in a 
wrong direction: they seem to have miscalculated the purpose 
of their attack on theory. From a pragmatist perspective their 
essay misses the target that it was supposed to hit though it has 
certainly produced important side-effects. One of those (possibly 
undesirable) side-effects involves the consolidation in the camp 
of all the conservative theorists who might have felt threatened 
by the rhetorical bravado with which Knapp and Michaels set 
about dismantling the pillars of theory. Another side-effect is 
connected with the opportunity to calibrate the pragmatists’ 
gunsights afforded by their essay’s shortcomings. Historically, 
“Against Theory” was no doubt a pioneering endeavour to bring a 
pragmatist mode of thinking to bear on literary studies.19
19 It must be acknowledged that it was not the only endeavour of that kind 
made in the early 1980’s. In 1980 Stanley Fish published his Is There a Text in 
This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities and in 1982 “What is 
the Meaning of a Text?,” an influential essay by Jeffrey Stout came out in New 
Literary History. But neither Fish nor Stout declare their own position to be so 
overtly pragmatist. Besides, unlike Knapp and Michaels’, their texts do not bear 
the qualities of a critical creed.
20 In his essay “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds,” 
Richard J. Bernstein lists as constitutive themes of the pragmatic ethos anti- 
foundationalism, fallibilism, pluralism, the social character of the self and the 
need to nurture a criticial community of inquirers as well as the awareness
In fact, this critical position is rooted in a philosophical tradi­
tion of over a century’s standing. Whatever they say about theory 
and practice, Knapp and Michaels bank on the cornerstones of prag­
matism erected by its progenitors — Charles Sanders Peirce, John 
Dewey and William James. Those cornerstones include, among oth­
ers, anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism, anti-representational- 
ism and fallibilism.20 A thorough discussion of their origins and 
development within pragmatism goes well outside the scope of this
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essay but I would like to give a brief characterisation of the prag­
matist understanding of their implications in the context of truth, 
which has always been one of pragmatism’s central concerns.* 21
and sensitivity to radical contingency and chance that mark the universe, our 
inquiries and our lives. For the purpose of my argument, which is principally 
concerned with the conjunction of the New Pragmatism and Literary Studies, I 
have modified his list to bring out those themes which are particularly resonant in 
the context of contemporary critical theory and practice. See Richard J. Bernstein, 
“Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Wounds,” in Pragmatism: A Reader, 
ed. Louis Menand (Vintage Books: New York, 1997), pp. 385—389.
21 William James considers the concept of truth so important that he defines 
pragmatism itself as “a genetic theory of what is meant by truth.” (William James, 
Pragmatism (New York: Dover Publications, 1995), p. 26).
22 Charles Sanders Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” in 
Pragmatism..., pp. 4—5.
Anti-foundationalism and fallibilism are clearly promulgated 
by Peirce in his attack on scholasticism in philosophy. Peirce is 
quite skeptical about the Cartesian project of establishing the ul­
timate test of certainty (which, according to Descartes, was to be 
found in the cogito, the individual consciousness) but he maintains 
that we cannot put into doubt everything at once: “We must begin 
with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon 
the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled 
by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can 
be questioned.”22 Nevertheless, they are prejudices rather than 
certitudes in the absolute sense and that insight does credit to 
pragmatists, who, unlike the scholastically-minded philosophers, 
are capable of allowing for their own fallibility.
In “The Fixation of Belief,” a momentous essay which Peirce 
delivered to the Metaphysical Club at Cambridge in 1877, he ex­
plores how we come to acquire beliefs which guide our desires 
and shape our actions. Of the four methods of fixing belief — the 
method of tenacity, the method of authority, the a priori method 
and the method of science — Peirce privileges the last one because 
only the method of science may ensure that man’s opinions coin­
cide with the facts. It is only by the method of science that we can 
get to know truth “which is distinguished from falsehood simply
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by this, that if acted on it will carry us to the point we aim at and 
not astray.”23 Again, Peirce’s point is not that the method of sci­
ence should provide us with “objective knowledge” of the world. In­
stead, he can envisage substantial practical advantages of holding 
beliefs acquired by that particular method. Clearly, the principal 
advantage is that such beliefs help us act effectively, that is, they 
are instrumental in our day-to-day dealing with our environment. 
This is not necessarily to say, however, that those beliefs are in any 
sense “truer” to what this environment is in itself.
23 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” in Pragmatism..., p. 25.
. 24 John Dewey, “Theories of Knowledge,” in Pragmatism..., p. 215.
25 Charles Sanders Peirce, “A Definition of Pragmatism,” in Pragmatism..., p. 56.
26 Cf. the following passage: “She [i.e. pragmatism] has no objection whatever to 
the realizing of abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with their 
aid and they actually carry you somewhere.” (W. James, Pragmatism'.., p. 29).
Equally critical of the scholastic methodology is John Dewey. 
In his “Theories of Knowledge” he takes scholasticism to task for 
propounding “a form of knowing which has no especial connection 
with any particular subject matter. It includes making distinctions, 
definitions, divisions, and classifications for the mere sake of making 
them — with no objective in experience.”24 Clearly, the scholastic 
method stands here for what Knapp and Michaels will identify 
as theory: it is a system of rules and principles that, by virtue of 
being abstracted from any specific context, are elevated to a higher 
epistemological status. Knowledge for Dewey, as well as for other 
pragmatists, can never be contextless. A problem is worth exploring 
if its solution makes a difference to how we see other problems or 
cope with other tasks, that is, if practical consequences follow from 
our exploration of it. As Peirce puts it, pragmatism, understood as “a 
certain maxim of logic,” was invented “to trace out in the imagination 
the conceivable practical consequences — that is, the consequences 
for deliberate, self-controlled conduct — of the affirmation or denial 
of [a] concept.”25 Therefore, pragmatism does not shun abstractions 
and generalisations.26 It is just that they must be subordinated to our 
specific goals and purposes rather than admired for their imperial 
insusceptibility to contextual applications.
This is exactly how William James approaches the concept of truth. 
In Pragmatism, his position on truth is at once anti-foundationalist, 
anti-essentialist and anti-representationalist. To begin with, James 
declares that purely objective truth is nowhere to be found because 
truth is what we make rather than discover.27 Thus truth is redefined 
as a dynamic property of an idea, as what happens to it in the process 
of its verification and validation.28 That paves the way for “the 
instrumental view of truth” which James, relying on Dewey and 
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, describes in the following words:
27 Ibidem, pp. 25, 78 and 84.
28 Ibidem, pp. 77—78.
29 Ibidem, p. 23 (italics supplied by James).
30 Ibidem, p. 86.
31 In the same context, Peirce does not mince his words and announces that 
the application of pragmatism to logic “speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish 
out of one’s own house. Each abstraction is either pronounced to be gibberish 
or is provided with a plain, practical definition.” (C.S. Peirce, “A Definition of 
Pragmatism...,” p. 58).
Ideas (which themselves are but parts of experience) become true just 
in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other 
parts of our experience, to summarize them and get about among 
them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable 
succession of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can 
ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any 
one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfac­
torily, working securely, simplifying, saving labour; is true for just 
so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.29
While essentialists tend to see truth as an immanent and 
immutable property of ideas, and representationalists stress the 
relation of correspondence between true ideas and whatever they 
stand for, James takes the true as merely “the expedient in our 
way of thinking.”30 His insistence on the utility of truth(s) is of 
course very much against the grain of rationalist and idealist 
views of what truth ought to be. But, at bottom, his position on 
the issue aptly illustrates pragmatism’s ambition to settle all those 
metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.31
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For a sustained critique of foundationalism, representational- 
ism and essentialism, let us turn now to two contemporary avatars 
of pragmatism, whose views, far from making up a system, will 
furnish the basic parameters of the New Pragmatist stance on the 
relationship between theory and critical practice. Richard Rorty’s 
position on the issue is informed by his conviction that literary 
criticism has recently succumbed to “a desire to paint the great 
big picture.”32 This is due to a mistaken assumption that literary 
critics, in order to validate their endeavours, should seek help from 
philosophy.33 In consequence, as Rorty has it, they “take philoso­
phy a bit too seriously.”34 Instead of focusing on small-scale jobs, 
literary critics ransack philosophy for “theories of meaning” or 
“theories of the nature of interpretation.” Again, Rorty deplores 
the literary theorists’ overabundant usage of the scientific rheto­
ric characteristic of the early period of analytic philosophy. Such a 
dalliance between literary criticism and philosophy must be fruit­
less because philosophy too has failed to yield interesting results 
with regard to the relevant topics. Thus what Rorty finds particu­
larly objectionable is an implicit way of instituting a hierarchy of 
the human sciences in which philosophy holds a privileged position 
vis-a-vis literary criticism.
32 Richard Rorty, “Texts and Lumps,” in R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, 
and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p. 78.
33 In Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Rorty argues for reversing the vector of 
influences: he stipulates that literary critics be “moral advisors” for ironists (i.e. 
a species of philosophers who are contrasted with metaphysicians) and instruct 
them in exercising the skill of synthesising. (See R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, 
Solidarity..., pp. 80—81).
34 R. Rorty, “Texts and Lumps...,” p. 78.
This is not to say, however, that philosophy and literary studies 
have nothing in common. On the contrary, seen from a pragmatist 
perspective, both enterprises share a similar untheoretical, nar­
rative style. According to Rorty, “telling stories about how one’s 
favorite and least favorite literary texts hang together is not to 
be distinguished from — is simply a species of — the ‘philosophi­
cal’ enterprise of telling stories about the nature of the universe 
which highlight all the things one likes best and least.”36 Therefore 
he recommends that, rather than try to see the great big picture, 
critics have their favourite philosophers — favourites chosen by 
consonance with their own projects and arranged into a canon of 
their own making. Rorty suggests that they “neither be afraid of 
subjectivity nor anxious for methodology, but simply proceed to 
praise [their] heroes and damn [their] villains by making invidi­
ous comparisons.”36 Thus critics needn’t worry about demonstrat­
ing that their choices are underwritten by “antecedently plau­
sible principles.”37 Though at first sight it looks like an invitation 
to interpretive anarchy38, Rorty’s reassurance merely implies 
that critical practice does not have to presuppose any theoretical 
foundations.
36 Ibidem, p. 79.
36 Ibidem.
37 Ibidem.
38 That interpretive anarchy is not a viable alternative to principled criti­
cism is aptly demonstrated by Stanley Fish, who argues that, though local and 
contextual, some interpretive constraints are always in place precisely because of 
the impossibility of trans-cending one’s situatedness and cultural assumptions. 
Accordingly, he claims that interpretation is itself “a structure of constraints, a 
structure which, because it is always and already in place, renders unavailable the 
independent or uninterpreted text and renders unimaginable the independent and 
freely interpreting reader.” (Stanley E. Fish, “Working on the Chain Gang,” in 
S.E. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of The­
ory in Literary and Legal Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 98; see also 
S.E. Fish, “Consequences,” in S.E. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally..., p. 323).
And yet Rorty does not deliver his final blow and spares theory 
for pedagogic purposes. Of course theory will no longer be entitled 
to guide critical practice as its methodological foundation. Like 
Knapp and Michaels, Rorty stigmatises theory’s aspirations to a 
metapractical status but he appreciates its generalisations and 
definitions for the purpose of summing up past achievements in 
the field of practice. On this view, theory follows practice and con­
stitutes its rhetoric, a didactic instrument which may be useful in 
the lecture hall, rather than a set of dogmas to be fixed above the 
entrance to the academy. In this sense, Rorty does not lose sight of 
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the practical consequences of theory’s existence. He can envisage 
an academic niche where theory will be harnessed to a pedagogic 
mission, and the mission may prove to be its redeeming feature.
Much less sympathetic to the project and prospects of Literary 
Studies is Stanley Fish, another literary critic who declares that, 
on his agenda, practice holds priority over theory. Fish’s views are 
in a sense symptomatic of the evolution of the New Pragmatist 
position within Literary Studies.39 His first critical contribution to 
produce some resonance in the field was meant to break with the 
tyranny of the New Criticism which still reigned in the American 
academy in the early 1970’s. Fish’s conception of affective stylis­
tics, which was first and foremost an attack on uncompromising 
formalism of the New Critics, was largely appreciated for its cham­
pioning of the reader and her/his role in generating the meaning 
of the text. It was already in “Literature in the Reader” that Fish 
signed for the anti-essentialist camp40, although his account of the 
reading process was still vulnerable to some trenchant criticisms 
which concerned his failure to define the conventions that readers 
follow when they read as well as his insistence on reading sen­
tences word by word in a temporal sequence.
39 To the best of my knowledge, Fish has never referred to his own critical po­
sition as New Pragmatist but his avowed anti-foundationalism is one of the defin­
ing features of any brand of pragmatism.
40 See Stanley E. Fish, “Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,” in 
Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, ed. Jane 
P. Tompkins (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 
p. 72, where he defines the meaning of a sentence in terms of an event involving 
the participation and contribution of the reader rather than the sentence’s 
immanent qualities alone.
Soon, however, Fish offered a rectified account (indeed, a theo­
retical model) of how we come to produce readings which evince 
intriguing convergencies and surprising differences. His concept 
of “interpretive communities” proved to be the coup de grace to 
the hopes of all those who still believed that he would convert to a 
foundationalist creed. In “Interpreting the Variorum,” a text first 
published in Critical Inquiry in 1976, Fish recognises “the stabil­
ity of interpretation among readers and the variety of interpreta­
tion in the career of a single reader.”41 Accordingly, he concedes 
the existence of something independent of and prior to individual 
interpretation. But his claim is that it is not to be sought in the in­
trinsic features of the text; rather, the stability and the variety are 
functions of interpretive strategies shared by those who make up 
interpretive communities. What is more, interpretive strategies, 
which allow us to differentiate between interpretive communities, 
do not come into force once we have read a book and are about to 
come up with an interpretation of it. They underlie the very produc­
tion of texts. Within a community, authors and readers are bound 
by the same conventions, and that allows authors to produce what 
they might expect to be interpreted in the light of their intended 
strategies. Therefore it is particularly important to bear in mind 
that no interpretive strategies are imposed by the text because the 
text itself is a function of a set of strategies. We belong to interpre­
tive communities even before we start reading or writing.
41 Stanley E. Fish, “Interpreting the Variorum,” in Modern Criticism and 
Theory: A Reader, ed. David Lodge (New York: Longman, 1988), p. 325.
42 Stanley E. Fish, “Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road,” in S. 
E. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally..., p. 9.
This is not to say that our choice of the strategies must be made 
once and for good. Unlike fixed and immutable principles, inter­
pretive strategies are volatile and flexible. And so are interpretive 
communities. Fish stresses their historicality but at the same time 
he acknowledges that, like any cultural assumptions we bring to 
bear on our interpretations, they appear to be incontestable and 
foundational. Again, this is tied up with his anti-essentialist posi­
tion on meaning: “Meanings that seem perspicuous and literal are 
rendered so by forceful interpretive acts and not by the properties 
of language.”42 In other words, as long as we recognise the author­
ity of a particular interpretive community — that is, as long as 
we believe in the foundational status of its interpretive strategies 
— we shall not be tempted to change our loyalties. Once we start 
entertaining doubts about its natural and universal sway over us, 
we are more and more likely to come under the influence of anoth­
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er one. There is no point, however, at which we can be “stateless”: 
belonging to some interpretive community means having beliefs 
and opinions, and thus it is an ineluctable aspect of our situated­
ness. As Fish puts it, “being situated not only means that one can­
not achieve a distance on one’s beliefs, but that one’s beliefs do not 
relax their hold because one ‘knows’ that they are local and not 
universal. This in turn means that even someone [...] who is firmly 
convinced of the circumstantiality of his convictions will neverthe­
less experience those convictions as universally, not locally, true.”43 
By the same token, the anti-foundationalist project itself has to 
rest on some implicit “foundations” — assumptions and beliefs 
that anti-foundationalists unflinchingly hold on to.
48 Stanley E. Fish, “Critical Self-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What We’re 
Doing?,” in S.E. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally..., p. 467.
44 Fish, like Knapp and Michaels, construes Theory as a set of principles, rules 
or procedures attached to no particular activity but thought of as a constraint on 
all fields of activity. See S.E. Fish, “Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist 
Road...,” p. 14.
45 Stanley E. Fish, “Consequences,” in S.E. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally..., 
p. 322.
46 See S.E. Fish, “Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road,” p. 26 
and Stanley E. Fish, “Anti-Foundationalism, Theory Hope, and the Teaching of 
Composition,” in S.E. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally..., p. 345.
According to Fish, those beliefs should be carefully distinguished 
from a theory.44 One of the principal contentions of declared anti- 
foundationalists is that their creed “really isn’t a theory at all; it 
is an argument against the possibility of theory.”45 But when Fish 
argues that theory cannot possibly succeed because it is merely an 
extension of and an elaboration on practice, he seems to be oblivious 
of the reciprocal nature of such relations. If indeed, by stressing 
the local, the historical, the contingent and the variable, anti- 
foundationalist thought offers us an account of how foundations 
emerge46, it is an account which generates some imperatives for 
critical practice. Of course, one of the most uncompromising 
imperatives is that practice should liberate itself from the yoke 
of theory. In the long run, then, anti-foundationalism cannot help 
functioning very much like the theory which it seeks to discredit. 
Fish might insist that his is a theoretical argument only in the 
sense of being involved in dismantling theory as such but, as I 
have demonstrated in the case of Knapp and Michaels’s essay, this 
argument is parasitical upon the discourse whose preservation is 
vital for the very practice of anti-foundationalism.
The question that pragmatists ask at this point is: “Why does 
an anti-foundationalist like Fish make such claims about theory 
and practice?” What is Fish angling for when he encourages lit­
erary critics to abandon theory and devote themselves to “pure” 
practice? An answer to this question is implied in his, as well as 
Knapp and Michaels’s, critique of theory’s metapractical preten­
sions. Fish wants us to see those pretensions in terms of a claim 
to institutional power: by elevating itself above practice, theory 
attempts to prescribe its procedures and mechanisms. In conse­
quence, practitioners of literary criticism should take counsel from 
those who are possessed of some arcane knowledge about what in­
terpretation is and how it is supposed to be carried out. As Fish 
puts it, “[ijnterpretation is not an abstract or contextless process, 
but one that elaborates itself in the service of a specific enter­
prise.”47 Therefore it is the degree of its influence on the shape 
of interpretive strategies that will determine the authority of the 
enterprise: “interpretation is a form of authority, since it is an ex­
tension of the prestige and power of an institution; and authority is 
a form of interpretation, since it is in its operations an application 
or “reading” of the principles embodied in that same institution.”48 
Thus theory’s claim to a metapractical status must be seen in the 
light of its advocates’ will to power.
47 Stanley E. Fish, “Fish v. Fiss,” in S.E. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally..., 
p. 135.
48 Ibidem.
By contrast, the New Pragmatists are not only out to 
destabilise theory’s regime but they also try to efface their 
own subversive force. Stanley Fish repeatedly stresses that 
theoretical pronouncements can have no consequences for 
any field outside the enterprise itself. His “no-consequences” 
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argument is endorsed by Knapp and Michaels who seem to 
cast doubt even on the effectiveness of their own arguments 
against theory.49 If theory relies on a rhetoric of methodological 
superiority in relation to practice, the New Pragmatism counters 
it with a rhetoric of self-effacement and renunciation of power.50 
But this rhetoric should not obscure the fact that both parties are 
engaged in the same power game. Fish may be dismissive of the 
scope and far-reaching effects of exercising metapractical power 
within the academy and yet his anti-foundationalist position is 
a powerful bid for institutional authority.51 It is not by accident 
that he has not published a single volume of practical criticism for 
several decades now52; instead, he has furthered his career and 
professional stature by excoriating theory and counselling others 
to focus on critical practice. As a result, his recriminations against 
theory might be construed as a way of generating unflagging 
interest in what is at issue in the debate between pragmatists and 
theorists while, in the final analysis, their controversy may be 
seen as nothing else but a professional mystification.
49 See S. Knapp and W.B. Michaels, “Reply to Our Critics...,” p. 105.
°° See W.J.T. Mitchell, “Introduction: Pragmatic Theory,” in Against Theo­
ry..., p. 4.
51 The irony of his position on the issue is that he has become one of the 
most influential and charismatic figures within, as well as outside, the American 
academy, with an exorbitant salary of 230,000 $ as Dean of the College of Liberal 
Arts and Sciences in Chicago.
52 To do him justice, it must be acknowledged that in 2001 he finally published, 
with Harvard University Press, his monumental study of Milton entitled How 
Milton Works.
All this is reminiscent of Fish’s own argument against anti­
professionalism. Fish takes anti-professionalism to be an attempt 
to reach a metaprofessional perspective by identifying the limita­
tions and dead-ends of self-centred professionalism. Anti-profes­
sionalism would thus offer a broader view of the profession and 
reinscribe it into a general picture of human activity and universal 
values. But on closer inspection the sharp distinction between the 
two perspectives collapses:
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As we have seen again and again, anti-professionalism is by and 
large a protest against those aspects of professionalism that consti­
tute a threat to individual freedom, true merit, genuine authority. 
It is therefore the strongest representation within the professional 
community of the ideals which give that community its (ideological) 
form. Far from being a stance taken at the margins or the periphery 
[...] anti-professionalism is the very center of the professional ethos, 
constituting by the very rigour of its opposition the true form of 
that which it opposes. Professionalism cannot do without anti-pro­
fessionalism: it is the chief support and maintenance of the profes­
sional ideology; its presence is a continual assertion and sign of the 
purity of the profession’s intentions.03
Fish concludes that anti-professionalism is professionalism 
itself in its purest form. Consequently, anti-professionalism 
cannot be a viable alternative to professionalism because it will 
never reach a vantage point from which to adopt a detached and 
metaprofessional stance on what it purports to defy. By analogy 
— though it is an analogy which Fish does not seem to find handy 
in his own argument — anti-theoretical pronouncements which 
contest theory will in the long run solidify the enterprise itself 
rather than undermine its ideological foundations.
In Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political 
Change, his major defence of the profession of literary criticism, 
Fish waxes conservative and resorts to arguments which are very 
difficult to square with his anti-foundationalism. He registers a 
threat to the identity of literary criticism, and, accordingly, he 
tries to isolate what should be preserved and protected against 
external pressures. First of all, Fish inveighs against the latest 
vogues in literary studies — interdisciplinarity and the New His­
toricism — for their ambition to connect up with what is going on 
in the political arena.53 4 *It is his conviction that literary criticism 
cannot, and should not, try to effect radical political changes be-
53 Stanley E. Fish, “Anti-Professionalism,” in S.E. Fish, Doing What Comes 
Naturally..., pp. 244—245.
54 See Stanley E. Fish, Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political
Change (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), pp. 47—48 and 51—52.
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cause it is “characterized by a limited set of concerns and if those 
concerns are replaced by some others and the questions internal 
to literary study — questions like ‘What does this poem mean?’ 
— are let go in favour of other, supposedly larger, questions, one 
would still be doing something, but it would not be literary criti­
cism.”55 It is his conviction that interdisciplinary approaches as 
well as historicist ones are informed by a misguided urge to find 
a political justification for doing literary criticism. This justifica­
tion, which is felt to be the profession’s raison d’etre these days, is 
supposed to give those perspectives a moral sanction to continue 
what they are doing.
50 Ibidem, p. 42.
06 Ibidem, p. 110.
57 Ibidem, p. 94.
58 Ibidem, p. 133.
By far the most controversial claim that Fish makes in Profes­
sional Correctness is that literary criticism does not need a moral 
sanction at all because “[ljiterary interpretation, like virtue, is its 
own reward.”56 This is how he explains the isolationist implications 
of his conception of the discipline: its only rationale lies in the plea­
sure and satisfaction it affords to its practitioners. Incredible as it 
sounds from a leading anti-foundationalist of the day, his advice 
to literary critics is that they confine themselves to interpreting 
the literary work itself (to “getting it right”) rather than use it as 
part of an extra-literary strategy. According to Fish, interpretive 
acts should have as their immediate aim “the telling of the truth 
about some text or group of texts.”57 It is a point that Fish makes 
repeatedly, and occasionally it takes the form of a plainly anti­
pragmatic desideratum-. “[y]ou can choose to do interpretive work, 
to try and get at the truth about texts or events or cultures [...] or 
you can choose to do political work; but you can’t do interpretive 
work [...] with the intention of doing political work because once 
you decide to do political work — that is, have before you from the 
start a particular political purpose you are trying to effect — you 
will be responsive and responsible to criteria that do not respect 
or even recognize the criteria of the academy.”58 Thus the choice
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is basically between being true to your profession’s imperatives by 
focusing on the exploration of what the text really means (of its 
truth) and using it (indeed, abusing it from the point of view of 
professional purity) for extra-literary purposes.
I see two practical problems with this idyllic picture of the 
discipline and its practitioners. First of all, when Fish insists on 
aiming our interpretations at the telling of the truth about a text, 
he seems to be regressing to an outmoded version of essentialism 
which takes the existence of each text’s truth as independent of 
our interpretive acts and unaffected by the historical, cultural 
and political situatedness of the reader. On the contrary, it is only 
in the light of some extratextual concerns and convictions that we 
can interpret anything at all; pure interpretation for its own sake 
is a fiction made up by those who want to disguise their actual 
ideological agendas. Secondly, Fish’s distinction between profes­
sional interpretation and the use one makes of a text for political 
purposes59 60runs against the grain of one of the tersest definitions 
of the pragmatist position on‘the issue offered by Richard Rorty 
who claims that “all anybody ever does with anything is use it.”00 
Consequently, no interpretation is free of some extra-literary as­
sumptions and pre-determined intentions as to its purpose and 
outcome. We never interpret just to interpret, out of pure respect 
for the object of our interpretation. Even if the sole purpose of 
our interpretation is the satisfaction that reading can afford us, it 
should not be mistaken for the disinterested uncovering of a text’s 
essence or its immanent truth.
59 A similar distinction is made by Umberto Eco in his essay “Overinterpreting 
Texts,” in Interpretation and Overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 45—66.
60 Richard Rorty, “The Pragmatist’s Progress,” in Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation..., p. 93.
Finally, let us go back to the issue of justification which, rather 
than constitute a moral sanction to practise Literary Studies, 
should further pragmatist goals and projects. It is my conviction 
that, if doing literary criticism is to be a purposeful and meaning­
ful activity, it must be tied up with the didactic responsibilities of
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the academy. The idea of the “ivory tower” — synonymous with 
such “academic virtues” as disinterestedness and impracticality 
— will never chime in with the pragmatist stance on the value of 
knowledge. John Dewey, a paradigmatic pragmatist in this respect, 
describes his theory of the method of knowing in the following 
words: “Its essential feature is to maintain the continuity of know­
ing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment. 
[...] Only that which has been organized into our disposition so as 
to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt 
our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really 
knowledge.”61 The corollary of that is that Literary Studies should 
never be merely “an object of aesthetic contemplation,”62 as Dewey 
has it. It is in the nature of the academic institution that literary 
scholars should use their knowledge and skills to affect their im­
mediate environment (i.e. their colleagues and students) with the 
intention (even if unacknowledged) of exerting some influence on 
the external world. What this necessitates is a close relationship 
between research and teaching; we should revive the 19th-century 
model of education which saw literary scholarship not as an end 
in itself but as a means of acquiring knowledge to be subsequently 
transmitted to students.63 At the same time let us bear in mind 
that such a transmission, despite its limited and unostentatious 
modus operandi, is in fact a political process which has some far- 
reaching effect on the views and personalities of those who lend us 
their ears.
61 J. Dewey, “Theories of Knowledge...,” pp. 216—217.
82 Ibidem, p. 214.
63 See Bruce E. Fleming, “What Is the Value of Literary Studies?,” New 
Literary History, Vol. 31 (2000), p. 469.
18 The Same ...
The notion of knowledge, though central to both sides of the 
academic coin (i.e. scholarship and teaching), does not necessarily 
have to be taken too seriously. Once again, if we see knowledge as 
an instrument — and that is how the New Pragmatists want to 
see Literary Studies — what matters is that it should serve our 
purposes. Our interpretations and the ways we talk about them, 
rather than aspire to scientific objectivity at all costs, should
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be persuasive and interesting. It is the degree of their influence 
on how our readers/listeners will see the texts that we want to 
bring to their attention that constitutes the ultimate test of our 
scholarly expertise. Of course, we may keep on pretending that 
there is some intrinsic value and meaning to our readings, that our 
canons are more than arbitrary, and that, at the end of the day, the 
most conscientious scholars will be able to spot the light of some 
profound truth about literature and the world at large. But there 
is no point in justifying that by some transcendental injunction 
enjoined upon each interpreter by the conditions of the possibility 
of all texts or by our mission and professional responsibilities that 
we bear to society. No matter whether we admit that to ourselves 
or try to come up with some high-faluting rationale for engaging in 
Literary Studies, we will do so in order to proselytise new converts 
to our point of view and thus make our own camp stronger and 
more influential (read: solidify our own professional position). The 
New Pragmatist paradigm, in turn, may prove to be a sobering 
corrective to the hypocrisy of all those who persistently deny that 
that is the ultimate reason for their (either theoretical or practical) 
interpretive activity.
Leszek Drong
Teoria inaczej: próba wpisania neopragmatyzmu amerykańskiego 
w dyskurs literaturoznawstwa
Streszczenie
Perspektywa krytyczna, która pojawiła się w literaturoznawstwie amerykań­
skim na początku lat osiemdziesiątych dwudziestego wieku, kwestionuje potrzebę 
zajmowania się teorią jako taką, definiując jednak ową teorię w bardzo zawężony 
sposób. Neopragmatyzm, którego jaskrawym i bardzo spektakularnym przykła­
dem jest esej Waltera Benna Michaelsa i Stevena Knappa Against Theory, stawia 
sobie za cel zdyskredytowanie teorii poprzez swoistą dekonstrukcję jej możliwości. 
Problem polega na tym, że teorię rozumianą jako „specyficzny zamysł krytyczny: 
próbę podporządkowania interpretacji poszczególnych tekstów jednej, ogólnej 
regule interpretacyjnej” zarzuciła w latach osiemdziesiątych większość literatu- 
roznawców. Dlatego też, zdaniem autora eseju Teoria inaczej, wartość neopragma-
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tystycznej krytyki teorii leży nie tyle w sile jej argumentów, ile raczej w retoryce 
wykorzystywanej przez Michaelsa, Knappa, Rorty’ego i Fisha. Taka „dysydencka” 
retoryka może wzbogacić nasz sposób postrzegania teorii i jej możliwości oraz 
ograniczeń; co więcej, neopragmatyzm amerykański można wykorzystać jako cen­
ną perspektywę w dydaktyce literaturoznawstwa.
Leszek Drong
Die Theorie anders: ein Versuch, den amerikanischen Neopragmatismus 
in den literaturwissenschaftlichen Diskurs einzupassen
Zusammenfassung
Eine kritische Ansicht, die in der amerikanischen Literaturwissenschaft zu 
Beginn der 80er Jahre des 2O.Jhs zum Vorschein gekommen ist, stellt die Be­
schäftigung mit der Theorie als solcher in Frage; dabei definiert sie die Theorie 
sehr eng. Neopragmatismus, dessen krasses und spektakuläres Beispiel der Essay 
von Walter Benn Michaels und Steven Knapp Against Theory ist, hat zum Ziel, 
die Theorie durch die Beanstandung von ihren Möglichkeiten zu diskreditieren. 
Das Problem liegt darin, dass die, als „ein spezifisches kritisches Vorhaben”: ein 
Versuch, die einzelnen Texte einer einzigen, allgemeinen Interpretationsregel 
unterzuordnen verstandene Theorie, schon in den 80er Jahren von den meisten 
Literaturwissenschaftlern aufgegeben wurde. Deswegen, so der Verfasser des 
vorliegenden Artikels, beruht die Bedeutung der neopragmatischen Kritik nicht 
auf der Kraft ihrer Argumente, sondern viel mehr auf der, von Michaels, Knapp, 
Rorty und Fish angewandten Rhetorik. Solche dissidentische Rhetorik kann unse­
re Beurteilung der Theorie und deren Möglichkeiten bereichern; vielmehr — der 
amerikanische Neopragmatismus kann in der literaturwissenschaftlichen Didak­
tik als eine wertvolle Methode verwendet werden.
